Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Beyond EvolutionHuman Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Anthony O'Hear

Print publication date: 1999

Print ISBN-13: 9780198250043

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198250045.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 10 July 2020

Immanent and Transcendent Dimensions of Reason

Immanent and Transcendent Dimensions of Reason

(p.14) 2 Immanent and Transcendent Dimensions of Reason
Beyond Evolution

Anthony O'Hear (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

There is a tension between considering humans as creatures of reason and as creatures of nature subject to Nature's categorical imperatives. While reason may raise sceptical doubts about our beliefs and practices, we cannot live as if these doubts were true. It is plausible that some of these deeply held beliefs and practices are so embedded because they promote survival and this might give rise to a Humean view that Nature is too strong for Reason. However, our nature as transcendently self‐conscious rational agents means that we should not abandon all thought of justifying our most basic beliefs in favour of a purely instrumental account of reason. Reason, for self‐conscious agents, has a vertical aspect enabling us to step outside our beliefs and practices and question their validity.

Keywords:   Hume, instrumental reason, justification, Nature, Reason, utility of beliefs

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .