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Responsibility and Atonement$
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Richard Swinburne

Print publication date: 1989

Print ISBN-13: 9780198248491

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198248490.001.0001

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Moral Responsibility and Weakness of Will

Moral Responsibility and Weakness of Will

(p.34) 2 Moral Responsibility and Weakness of Will
Responsibility and Atonement

Richard Swinburne (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Agents are praiseworthy for doing what they believe to be supererogatory, blameworthy for doing what they believe to be wrong. To have a belief that some action is morally good involves having some desire (inclination) to do it. But we evince weakness of will when we yield to a stronger desire to do what we believe to be not the best action.

Keywords:   Aquinas, blame, desire, Thomas Nagel, praise, weakness of will

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