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IgnoranceA Case for Scepticism$
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Peter Unger

Print publication date: 1978

Print ISBN-13: 9780198244172

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198244177.001.0001

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A Classical Form of Sceptical Argument

A Classical Form of Sceptical Argument

(p.7) I A Classical Form of Sceptical Argument

Peter Unger (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Discusses, and expands on, the Cartesian skeptical argument. According to this argument, we do not have knowledge about the external world since we cannot know that we are not being deceived into having false beliefs about the external world. The chapter strengthens this argument in order to establish that such knowledge is not even possible, and extends it to exclude knowledge about other times as well. It rejects G. E. Moore's reversal of the skeptical argument as counterintuitive. Anticipating the discussions in later chapters, a prima facie case is made for the impossibility of even reasonably believing anything about the external world, and for the consonance of the skeptical results with considerations about certainty.

Keywords:   certainty, deception, Descartes, external world, knowledge, G. E. Moore, other times, reasonable belief, skeptical argument

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