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The Nature of Necessity$
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Alvin Plantinga

Print publication date: 1978

Print ISBN-13: 9780198244141

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198244142.001.0001

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God and Necessity

God and Necessity

Chapter:
(p.196) X God and Necessity
Source:
The Nature of Necessity
Author(s):

Alvin Plantinga (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198244142.003.0010

In Ch.10, I apply the previous chapters’ account of modality to the Ontological Argument for the existence of God. I begin the chapter by attempting to develop a sound version of the Ontological Argument based on the work of St. Anselm. I conclude that this argument fails, as does a more recent attempt by Charles Hartshorne and Norman Malcolm. I then give a modal version of the Ontological Argument that is sound and is based on the claim that the property of unsurpassable greatness is possibly exemplified. I grant that this premise is not likely to be accepted by those who do not already hold that the property is actually exemplified, but I argue that it is still rational to accept the premise.

Keywords:   Anselm, existence, God, Charles Hartshorne, Norman Malcolm, modal, Ontological Argument

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