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The Nature of Necessity$
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Alvin Plantinga

Print publication date: 1978

Print ISBN-13: 9780198244141

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198244142.001.0001

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(p.222) Appendix Quine's Objection to Quantified Modal Logic

(p.222) Appendix Quine's Objection to Quantified Modal Logic

The Nature of Necessity

Alvin Plantinga

Oxford University Press

I begin by clarifying W.V. Quine's objection to quantified modal logic. I then consider responses from Jaako Hintikka and Arthur Smullyan. I demonstrate that both of them rely on distinguishing between proper and improper terms. Quine's reply to Hintikka and Smullyan is that their solution entails that quantified modal logic is committed to Aristotelian Essentialism. I conclude that Quine is right that quantified modal logic presupposes essentialism, but I also claim that this is not a reason to reject quantified modal logic.

Keywords:   Aristotelian Essentialism, essentialism, Hintikka, improper term, modal logic, proper term, quantified modal logic, Quine, Smullyan

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