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The Coherence of Theism$
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Richard Swinburne

Print publication date: 1993

Print ISBN-13: 9780198240709

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198240708.001.0001

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Conditions for Coherence—I

Conditions for Coherence—I

Chapter:
(p.11) 2 Conditions for Coherence—I
Source:
The Coherence of Theism
Author(s):

Richard Swinburne

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198240708.003.0002

A proposition or coherent statement is one such that it makes sense to suppose that it and any statement entailed by it are true. Analytic statements are distinguished from synthetic (or factual) ones. The weak verificationist principle claimed that to be factual, a statement had to be confirmable or disconfirmable by an observation statement. But it is unclear which statements are observation statements, and how one could show that a statement was confirmable or disconfirmable by one. And anyway, there are no good arguments for believing the vertificationist principle to be true.

Keywords:   analytic, coherence, confirmation, observation statement, synthetic, verificationism

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