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Kant's Theory of MindAn Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason$
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Karl Ameriks

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198238973

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198238975.001.0001

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Ideality

Ideality

Chapter:
(p.234) Chapter VII Ideality
Source:
Kant's Theory of Mind
Author(s):

Karl Ameriks (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198238975.003.0007

This chapter discusses the most general aspects of Kant's discussion of the self and gives an overview of the full range of topics that he covered in his philosophical discussion of ‘psychological’ issues. There are two especially important issues requiring further discussion here: apperception and idealism. I explain the significance of Kant's Critical distinction between ‘apperception’ and ‘inner sense’, and discuss different views on how these terms might be defined. I then discuss the radical nature of Kant's claim about the transcendental ideality of all our determinate theoretical self‐knowledge, and evaluate various hypotheses about how to interpret transcendental idealism in general.

Keywords:   apperception, essence, idealism, inner sense, passivity, self‐knowledge, species, temporality, transcendental

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