This chapter focuses on a host of issues that are central to Kant's philosophy in general, and his understanding of the mind in particular, even though they do not correspond to the heading of a specific paralogism. I explain how the modern problem of interaction, in general, dominated Kant's early work, and how Kant's views on the specific issue of mind‐body interaction always have to be approached in this context. Indicative of the complexity of his position here is the fact that in the Critique's second ed., Kant changes the topic of the fourth paralogism, to have it focus on the metaphysical issue of mind‐body interaction, whereas in the first ed., it concerns the epistemological relation of the self to external objects. I explain how and why the latter topic becomes central to other parts of the second ed. Critique, especially, the new section called the Refutation of Idealism.
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