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Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind$
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Gilbert Harman

Print publication date: 1999

Print ISBN-13: 9780198238027

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198238029.001.0001

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Doubts About Conceptual Analysis

Doubts About Conceptual Analysis

Chapter:
(p.138) 6 Doubts About Conceptual Analysis
Source:
Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind
Author(s):

Gilbert Harman (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198238029.003.0007

A response to a paper by Frank Jackson. Although philosophers sometimes defend certain ‘analyses’ as analytic or a priori truths, such analyses are far from obviously true and are defended inductively. Contrary to Jackson's claim, the rejection of analyticity is based on consideration of central cases.

Keywords:   a priori, analyticity, aprioricity, conceptual analysis, Frank Jackson

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