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Truth, Language, and HistoryPhilosophical Essays Volume 5$
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Donald Davidson

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780198237570

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2005

DOI: 10.1093/019823757X.001.0001

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Thinking Causes

Thinking Causes

(p.185) 13 Thinking Causes
Truth, Language, and History

Donald Davidson

Oxford University Press

This essay discusses a common criticism of the Davidson’s theory of Anomalous Monism, namely, that according to this theory the mental is causally inert. It is argued that this criticism stems from a misunderstanding of the use of the concept of supervenience, which implies ontological monism, but not definitional or nomological reductionism. The criticism also fails to appreciate that causal relations are extensional relations which hold between singular events no matter how they are described.

Keywords:   theory of anomalous monism, mental, physical, supervenience

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