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The Reason's Proper StudyEssays towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics$
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Bob Hale and Crispin Wright

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780198236399

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198236395.001.0001

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Singular Terms (2) 1

Singular Terms (2) 1

(p.48) 2 Singular Terms (2)1
The Reason's Proper Study

Bob Hale (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This essay is the sequel to ’Singular Terms (1)’ (also in this volume). After reviewing the criterion for singular termhood proposed in the earlier paper, Hale moves on to considering objections to the proposal. In particular, he discusses criticisms made by Linda Wetzel (Mind 1990) against Michael Dummett's original formulation of the ’inferential role’ part of the test. Hale argues that by modifying the detail of Dummett's proposals in well‐motivated ways, one can formulate a version of the inferential role test that can answer all of the criticisms. The final section considers how one should assess the adequacy of inferential role tests of this kind.

Keywords:   Context Principle, Dummett, Frege, inferential role, singular terms, Wetzel

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