Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
ConceptsWhere Cognitive Science Went Wrong$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jerry A. Fodor

Print publication date: 1998

Print ISBN-13: 9780198236368

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198236360.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 16 July 2019

Innateness and Ontology, Part II: Natural Kind Concepts

Innateness and Ontology, Part II: Natural Kind Concepts

Chapter:
(p.146) 7 Innateness and Ontology, Part II: Natural Kind Concepts
Source:
Concepts
Author(s):

Jerry A. Fodor (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198236360.003.0007

Natural kind properties are not mind dependent. So why are concepts such as WATER, GIRAFFE, etc. acquired from their instances? Critical discussion of the view that concepts of natural kinds are the models on which psychological theories of concepts should be constructed.

Keywords:   concepts, innateness, natural kinds

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .