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ConceptsWhere Cognitive Science Went Wrong$
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Jerry A. Fodor

Print publication date: 1998

Print ISBN-13: 9780198236368

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198236360.001.0001

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Prototypes and Compositionality 1

Prototypes and Compositionality 1

Chapter:
(p.88) 5 Prototypes and Compositionality1
Source:
Concepts
Author(s):

Jerry A. Fodor (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198236360.003.0005

A consideration of the view, widely held in cognitive science, that typical concepts are complex statistical structures (`bundles of subjective probabilities’). The crucial difficulty: since probabilities don’t compose, the productivity and systematicity of conceptual systems is inexplicable. The `pet fish’ problem and its variants. The `theory theory’ about concept possession.

Keywords:   compositionality, concept possession, concepts, meaning postulates, prototypes, subjective probability, theory theory

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