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ConceptsWhere Cognitive Science Went Wrong$
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Jerry A. Fodor

Print publication date: 1998

Print ISBN-13: 9780198236368

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198236360.001.0001

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The Demise of Definitions, Part II: The Philosopher's Tale

The Demise of Definitions, Part II: The Philosopher's Tale

Chapter:
(p.69) 4 The Demise of Definitions, Part II: The Philosopher's Tale
Source:
Concepts
Author(s):

Jerry A. Fodor (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198236360.003.0004

A consideration of `philosophical’ evidence, the view that typical concepts are complex. Connections with questions about analyticity and learnability. The alternative view (`conceptual atomism’)‐that typical concepts are primitives‐is introduced and defended. The importance of distinguishing the semantic issues about conceptual atomism from the epistemological ones.

Keywords:   analyticity, concepts, conceptual atomism, learnability

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