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ConceptsWhere Cognitive Science Went Wrong$
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Jerry A. Fodor

Print publication date: 1998

Print ISBN-13: 9780198236368

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198236360.001.0001

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Unphilosophical Introduction: What Concepts Have to Be

Unphilosophical Introduction: What Concepts Have to Be

Chapter:
(p.23) 2 Unphilosophical Introduction: What Concepts Have to Be
Source:
Concepts
Author(s):

Jerry A. Fodor (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198236360.003.0002

Adequacy conditions on a theory of concepts: Concepts are mental particulars; they function as perceptual and cognitive categories; they are compositional; many of them are learned; they are typically public (i.e. shared by many minds). Satisfying the publicity condition presupposes a notion of conceptual identity (mere similarity won’t do).

Keywords:   compositionality, concepts, identity, mental particulars, publicity

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