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ConceptsWhere Cognitive Science Went Wrong$
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Jerry A. Fodor

Print publication date: 1998

Print ISBN-13: 9780198236368

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198236360.001.0001

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Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory

Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory

Chapter:
(p.1) 1 Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory
Source:
Concepts
Author(s):

Jerry A. Fodor (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198236360.003.0001

Concepts as central theoretical constructs in cognitive science. Theories of concepts and theories of concept possession. Representational. The place of concepts in `representational theories of mind’. Basic assumptions of the discussion to follow: Psychological explanations are typically nomic; mental representations are the primitive bearers of intentional content; concepts are the constituents of propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires; thinking is computing; meaning is information; concepts are the typical proximal causes of behavior. Concepts as `Modes of Presentation of objects and properties’.

Keywords:   cognitive science, concept possession, concepts, content, intentionality, propositional attitudes, psychological explanation, representation, thinking

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