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The Seas of Language$
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Michael Dummett

Print publication date: 1996

Print ISBN-13: 9780198236214

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198236212.001.0001

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Frege and Husserl on Reference

Frege and Husserl on Reference

Chapter:
(p.224) 10 Frege and Husserl on Reference
Source:
The Seas of Language
Author(s):

Michael Dummett (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198236212.003.0010

David Bell argued in his book Husserl that Frege's notion of reference was realist, whereas Husserl's notion of reference in Logical Investigations was non‐realist. The suitable notion of reference should reconcile between extensional and intensional modes of speaking of the object. According to Husserl, intentional objects do not form an ontological category: to speak of them is to adopt the material mode of saying what, in the formal mode, relates to a singular term standing in an intensional context. Thus, Husserl's solution closely resembles Frege's, and both are essentially realist ones.

Keywords:   David Bell, Frege, Husserl, Intensional context, realism, reference, sense

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