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On IdeasAristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms$
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Gail Fine

Print publication date: 1995

Print ISBN-13: 9780198235491

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198235496.001.0001

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The Argument from Relatives

The Argument from Relatives

Chapter:
(p.142) 10 The Argument from Relatives
Source:
On Ideas
Author(s):

Gail Fine (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198235496.003.0010

Fine begins to examine the so‐called ‘More Accurate’ arguments, beginning with the Argument from Relatives. The Argument from Relatives is important for two reasons; it is the only argument that follows Plato in distinguishing between predicates like ‘equal’ and those like ‘man’; and it is the only argument that Aristotle ascribes to the Platonists, apart from the Metaphysics I passages that mention some kind of change. Fine has already argued that when Aristotle says that Plato introduced forms because of change, we should, if possible, take him to mean that Plato introduced forms not because of succession but because of compresence. The notion of homonymy is crucial to the Argument from Relatives, because the argument takes various properties, e.g. the notion of ‘equal’, to be non‐homonymous or synonymous; but for epistemological and metaphysical reasons, and not for semantic reasons. Fine also argues that, while the Argument from Relatives takes forms to be self‐predicative paradigms, this does not mean that the forms are particulars; the argument can be taken to conceive forms as properties, i.e. universals.

Keywords:   equal, change, compresence, epistemology, homonymy, properties, semantics, succession, synonymy, the ‘More Accurate’ arguments, universals

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