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Ignorance and ImaginationThe Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness$
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Daniel Stoljar

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195306583

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195306589.001.0001

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 A Posteriori Entailment

 A Posteriori Entailment

Chapter:
(p.175) 9 A Posteriori Entailment
Source:
Ignorance and Imagination
Author(s):

Daniel Stoljar

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195306589.003.0009

This chapter presents the view that the supervenience of the experiential on the non-experiential is irreducibly a posteriori — the a posteriori entailment view. The main problem for this view emerges when we notice that Kripke, the philosopher who did most to make it prominent, also considered and rejected it. The lesson of Kripke’s discussion on this point is that the mere idea of a posteriori entailment does not solve the problem of experience, and therefore that a proponent of the a posteriori entailment view is obliged to add further material. On the other hand, an examination of what this further material might be yields the result that either the a posteriori entailment view has no answer to the arguments, or else collapses into the epistemic view.

Keywords:   necessary a posteriori, Kripke, conceivability, possibility

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