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Ignorance and ImaginationThe Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness$
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Daniel Stoljar

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195306583

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195306589.001.0001

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 Objections and Replies

 Objections and Replies

(p.142) 8 Objections and Replies
Ignorance and Imagination

Daniel Stoljar

Oxford University Press

Two objections to the epistemic view are addressed. According to the first, the epistemic view is mistaken because if the problem at issue is understood correctly, we are in possession of the relevant truths. According to the second, the epistemic view is mistaken because it has a range of alarming side effects, some of which have been suggested by proponents of the view themselves. These objections raise important questions, but it is suggested that reflection on them strengthens, rather than weakens, the epistemic view.

Keywords:   structure, function, intrinsic properties, objectivity, perceptual availability

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