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Ignorance and ImaginationThe Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness$
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Daniel Stoljar

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195306583

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195306589.001.0001

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 General Plausibility

 General Plausibility

Chapter:
(p.87) 5 General Plausibility
Source:
Ignorance and Imagination
Author(s):

Daniel Stoljar

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195306589.003.0005

The next three chapters turn from E1 to E2, and discuss the case for believing the ignorance hypothesis in the first place. This chapter starts by emphasizing our ignorance in general, our ignorance of experience in particular, the way in which the assumption of ignorance explains a philosophical predicament that otherwise remains elusive, and the way in which the ignorance hypothesis is suggested by the basic structure of the logical problem. The epistemic view is also compared and contrasted with McGinn’s mysterianism.

Keywords:   mysterianism, empirical ignorance, logic, experience

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