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Moral Skepticisms$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195187724

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195187725.001.0001

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(p.184) 9 Intuitionism
Moral Skepticisms

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter criticizes moral intuitionism, which claims that some moral beliefs are justified independently of any ability to infer them from other beliefs. It defines moral intuitionism, and argues that beliefs need confirmation when they are partial, controversial, emotional, or formed in circumstances that are conducive to illusion or unreliability. Empirical research is cited to show that moral beliefs are subject to these problems and, hence, need confirmation by some inference, so moral intuitionism cannot solve the skeptical regress problem.

Keywords:   moral intuitionism, reliabilism, externalism, disagreement, partiality, emotion, heuristic, illusion, Audi, Horowitz

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