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Moral Skepticisms$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195187724

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195187725.001.0001

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Normativism

Normativism

Chapter:
(p.153) 8 Normativism
Source:
Moral Skepticisms
Author(s):

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195187725.003.0008

This chapter covers normativism, which attempts to derive moral conclusions from normative but non-moral premises. One version refers to moral explanations, another version includes contractarianism and contractualism, which justifies moral beliefs by reference to contractors who are rational, impartial, and/or reasonable. Neither version can solve the skeptical regress problem.

Keywords:   normativism, moral explanations, contractarianism, contractualism, rationality, impartiality, reasonableness, Harman, Sturgeon, Thomson

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