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Moral Skepticisms$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195187724

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195187725.001.0001

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Classy Moral Pyrrhonism

Classy Moral Pyrrhonism

(p.112) 6 Classy Moral Pyrrhonism
Moral Skepticisms

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter applies the general epistemology in Chapter 5 to moral beliefs in particular, and discusses the relevance of moral nihilism. It presents a moderate classy Pyrrhonian moral skepticism, which claims that some moral beliefs can be justified out of a modest contrast class, but no moral beliefs can be justified out of an unlimited contrast class. Since neither contrast class is the relevant one, no moral belief is justified without qualification.

Keywords:   moral contrast class, relevance, moral nihilism, Pyrrhonian moral skepticism, Academic moral skepticism, moderate moral skepticism, contextualism

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