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Moral Skepticisms$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195187724

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195187725.001.0001

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In Contrast with What?

In Contrast with What?

Chapter:
(p.83) 5 In Contrast with What?
Source:
Moral Skepticisms
Author(s):

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195187725.003.0005

This chapter develops a contrastivist account of justified belief in general, not only within morality. It argues that contrary to contextualism, no contrast class is ever really the relevant one, even in a given context. The result is a general theory of epistemology called “classy Pyrrhonian skepticism,” that is compatible with the moderate skeptical claim that some beliefs are justified out of a modest contrast class, but none is justified out of an unlimited or extreme contrast class.

Keywords:   justified belief, contrast class, Pyrrhonism, Pyrrhonian skepticism, Academic skepticism, moderate skepticism, contextualism, relevance

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