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Moral Skepticisms$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195187724

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195187725.001.0001

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Are Moral Beliefs Truth‐Apt?

Are Moral Beliefs Truth‐Apt?

Chapter:
(p.16) 2 Are Moral Beliefs Truth‐Apt?
Source:
Moral Skepticisms
Author(s):

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195187725.003.0002

This chapter discusses expressivism as a form of moral skepticism that denies the truth-aptness of moral beliefs and judgments. It focuses on whether expressivists can solve the problem of embedding (also known as the Frege problem) by allowing that some moral beliefs have a minimal kind of truth, and whether expressivists can account for the apparent objectivity of moral beliefs. It concludes that if expressivists succeed in mimicking all apparently realistic moral language, then expressivism does not really matter to moral epistemology.

Keywords:   expressivism, moral realism, truth, truth-aptness, objectivity, embedding, Frege problem, Blackburn, Gibbard

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