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Moral Skepticisms$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195187724

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195187725.001.0001

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Coherentism

Coherentism

Chapter:
(p.220) 10 Coherentism
Source:
Moral Skepticisms
Author(s):

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195187725.003.0010

This chapter explains moral coherentism as the view that some moral beliefs are justified by virtue of cohering with a system of belief that is coherent in the sense that it is consistent, connected, and comprehensive. Second-order beliefs about reliability are introduced to handle standard objections to coherentism. It concludes that coherence can make some moral beliefs justified out of a modest contrast class, but not out of an extreme contrast class with moral nihilism. This final chapter, together with the rest of Part 2, thus leads to moderate moral skepticism.

Keywords:   coherentism, coherence, consistency, connectedness, comprehensiveness, reflective equilibrium, Sayre-McCord, Brink

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