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Pyrrhonian Skepticism$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780195169720

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195169727.001.0001

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The Agrippan Argument and Two Forms of Skepticism

The Agrippan Argument and Two Forms of Skepticism

(p.121) 6 The Agrippan Argument and Two Forms of Skepticism
Pyrrhonian Skepticism

Michael Williams

Oxford University Press

This essay argues that the Pyrrhonian regress argument presupposes a Prior Grounding conception of justification. This is contrasted with a Default and Challenge structure, which leads to a contextualist picture of justification. Contextualism is said to incorporate the best features of its traditionalist rivals — foundationalism and coherentism — and also to avoid skepticism. It is argued that we should not ask which conception is really true, but instead give up epistemological realism.

Keywords:   Pyrrhonian skepticism, regress, Prior Grounding, Default and Challenge, foundationalism, coherentism, contextualism, epistemological realism

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