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Deflating Existential ConsequenceA Case for Nominalism$
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Jody Azzouni

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780195159882

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0195159888.001.0001

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Criteria for What Exists

Criteria for What Exists

Chapter:
(p.81) 4 Criteria for What Exists
Source:
Deflating Existential Consequence
Author(s):

Jody Azzouni (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195159888.003.0005

Raises the question of whether there are philosophical arguments that can establish a criterion for what exists. Shows by a counterexample describing two ontological practices with fiction that no such argument can be sustained. Argues that “folk ontology” takes ontological independence to be necessary for what exists. Illustrates that we have a requirement, on things we take to be ontologically independent of us, that we show that, and how our epistemic access to such items is reliable.

Keywords:   criteria for what exists, epistemic access, existence, fiction, folk ontology, ontological independence, reliability

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