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Libertarian Accounts of Free Will$
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Randolph Clarke

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780195159875

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/019515987X.001.0001

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The Freedom of Decisions and Other Actions

The Freedom of Decisions and Other Actions

Chapter:
(p.119) 7 The Freedom of Decisions and Other Actions
Source:
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Author(s):

Randolph Clarke (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019515987X.003.0007

Libertarian accounts commonly hold that only certain acts of will, such as decisions (or choices), can be directly free, with the freedom of actions of other types—whether mental or overt, bodily actions—deriving from that of these acts of will. Here this willist view of freedom is rejected in favor of an actionist view. Event-causal libertarian accounts (and agent-causal accounts that employ an event-causal theory of action) can do as good a job of characterizing the freedom of actions other than decisions as they can in the case of decisions.

Keywords:   act of will, action, agent-causal libertarian accounts, causal theory of action, choice, decision, event-causal libertarian accounts, free action, mental action, overt action, will

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