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Socrates, Pleasure, and Value$
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George Rudebusch

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780195159615

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195159616.001.0001

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The Intrinsic Value of Sense Pleasure and Pain

The Intrinsic Value of Sense Pleasure and Pain

Chapter:
(p.81) Seven The Intrinsic Value of Sense Pleasure and Pain
Source:
Socrates, Pleasure, and Value
Author(s):

George Rudebusch (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195159616.003.0007

I interpret and defend Socrates’ account of sensate pleasure and pain. Lovers of sensations (in the Epicurean tradition) will find Socrates’ restriction of pleasure's value to modal (in particular, moral) activity incredible. Nevertheless, I argue (following the Stoic tradition) that the value sensations have, lies not in their being sensations but in their being activities. On my interpretation, the measuring skill of the value of pleasure is idealized Socratic cross‐examination or dialectic.

Keywords:   dialectic, Epicureanism, hedonism, Plato, pleasure, Socrates, stoicism, wisdom

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