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Socrates, Pleasure, and Value$
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George Rudebusch

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780195159615

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195159616.001.0001

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How Socrates Can Make Both Pleasure and Virtue the Chief Good

How Socrates Can Make Both Pleasure and Virtue the Chief Good

Chapter:
(p.123) Ten How Socrates Can Make Both Pleasure and Virtue the Chief Good
Source:
Socrates, Pleasure, and Value
Author(s):

George Rudebusch (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195159616.003.0010

The Socrates of early Platonic dialogs defends both the following claims about human good: (i) Pleasure is the good (in the Protagoras); (ii) Virtue is the good (in the Apology and Crito). I reconcile these claims by showing how Socrates can identify virtuous activity with pleasant activity for a human being. The key is to interpret pleasure as modal, not sensate.

Keywords:   happiness, hedonism, human good, Plato, pleasure, Socrates, virtue, virtue supremacism

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