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Socrates, Pleasure, and Value$
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George Rudebusch

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780195159615

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195159616.001.0001

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Introduction

Introduction

Chapter:
(p.3) One Introduction
Source:
Socrates, Pleasure, and Value
Author(s):

George Rudebusch (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195159616.003.0001

This chapter presents the problem that the book solves. The problem is that Socrates in different places argues for three seemingly incompatible theses about the human good: it is pleasure; it is not pleasure; it is virtue. The solution is to harmonize these theses by distinguishing Socrates’ theory of pleasure from competing theories and by identifying virtuous activity with pleasant activity for a human being.

Keywords:   Epicurean, hedonism, human good, Kantian, Plato, pleasure, Socrates, stoicism, virtue supremacism

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