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Extending OurselvesComputational Science, Empiricism, and Scientific Method$
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Paul Humphreys

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780195158700

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195158709.001.0001

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Further Issues

Further Issues

Chapter:
Further Issues (p.136)
Source:
Extending Ourselves
Author(s):

Paul Humphreys (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195158709.003.0005

Various underdetermination arguments against selective realism are explored and rebutted. The role of abstraction and idealization in templates is explored. The fact that most computational processes are epistemically opaque is emphasized, and the effect that opacity has on scientific knowledge is explained using the Ising model as an example. Arguments are given for emphasizing mathematical form over logical form in the philosophy of science, and for emphasizing methods applicable in practice over those applicable only in principle.

Keywords:   abstraction, idealization, Ising model, logical form, mathematical form, methods, realism, scientific knowledge, template, underdetermination

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