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Motivation and Agency$
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Alfred R. Mele

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780195156171

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/019515617X.001.0001

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Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons

Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons

Chapter:
(p.69) 3 Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons
Source:
Motivation and Agency
Author(s):

Alfred R. Mele (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019515617X.003.0004

Investigates the connection between motivation and reasons for action. It begins with a sketch of Donald Davidson's influential version of the view that reasons for action are states of mind. It then undermines some criticisms of a broadly Davidsonian view of action explanation, including objections by Rosalind Hursthouse and T. M. Scanlon. Finally, it builds a theoretical bridge between work on its central topic by two groups of theorists: those guided primarily by a concern with the evaluation of actions or their agents (“evaluators”), and those primarily guided instead by an interest in the explanation of intentional actions (“explainers”). Motivational and normative notions of reasons for action are distinguished.

Keywords:   action, agent, Davidson, explanation of action, motivation, motivational reason, normative reason, reasons, Scanlon

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