Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Oxford Handbook of Rationality$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Alfred R. Mele and Piers Rawling

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780195145397

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0195145399.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 20 May 2019

KANT

KANT

Rationality as Practical Reason

Chapter:
(p.93) chapter 6 KANT
Source:
The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
Author(s):

Onora O'Neill

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195145399.003.0006

O'Neill's central concern here is to explicate Kant's account of how we could have unconditional practical reasons to do as morality requires, where unconditional practical reasons are those not based upon arbitrarily chosen ends. But then, what is their basis? Kant's proposal, O'Neill argues, is that what makes a practical reason unconditional is its universal recognizability. An unconditional practical reason is one that can be seen to be a reason for action by any rational audience; its appeal relies on no parochial concerns. Such universal appeal is captured by the categorical imperative test (O'Neill examines in detail three of the formulations of this): only principles of action that pass this test can be universally recognized as yielding practical reasons.

Keywords:   arbitrariness, categorical imperative, end, morality, practical, principle, reason, unconditional reasons, universality, recognizability

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .