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Morality, Mortality Volume II: Rights, Duties, and Status$
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F. M. Kamm

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780195144024

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195144023.001.0001

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Harming, not Aiding, and Positive Rights

Harming, not Aiding, and Positive Rights

Chapter:
(p.121) 5 Harming, not Aiding, and Positive Rights
Source:
Morality, Mortality Volume II: Rights, Duties, and Status
Author(s):

F. M. Kamm (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195144023.003.0006

Considers what would follow if the General Equivalence Thesis (GE) of the moral equivalence of harming and not aiding (in cases in which less than life is at stake) were true. The possible existence of positive rights (or duties minus correlative rights) is considered, and an argument against positive rights by Judith Thomson is examined. Arguments are considered that attempt to derive positive rights or duties from the existence of negative rights and a warning given against the failure to consider the role of independent rights or self‐standing claims to things, and the significance of already having had something. An examination is made of how far it is possible to come, consistent with Thesis GE, toward deriving the radical conclusion that we may have a right to something to which we have no independent right or self‐standing claim if it is not permissible to take it from us.

Keywords:   duties, duties minus correlative rights, General Equivalence Thesis, harming, independent rights, moral equivalence, negative rights, not aiding, positive rights, self‐standing claims, Judith Thomson

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