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Morality, Mortality Volume II: Rights, Duties, and Status$
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F. M. Kamm

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780195144024

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195144023.001.0001

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Objections and Conceptions of Moral Equivalence

Objections and Conceptions of Moral Equivalence

(p.63) 3 Objections and Conceptions of Moral Equivalence
Morality, Mortality Volume II: Rights, Duties, and Status

F. M. Kamm (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The first section of Ch. 3 is concerned with objections and alternatives to the arguments and analyses presented in the first two chapters on the moral equivalence of killing and letting die. Two issues are dealt with first: the issue of self‐ownership and the negative/positive rights distinction, and the issue of per se moral differences only sometimes making a difference in kill and let‐die cases depending on contexts. The relation that there might be between the killing/letting‐die distinction and the intention/foresight distinction (whose moral significance is described by the Doctrine of Double Effect) is considered. Particular attention is paid to the objections Shelly Kagan has made to the author's proposals and to the alternative views on positive and negative agency that Warren Quinn developed. The second section of the chapter returns to examine the stronger and weaker notions of per se moral equivalence, their differential relation to the moral equivalence of cases, and what they reveal about explanation in ethics and aesthetics.

Keywords:   aesthetics, alternatives, conceptions, context, Doctrine of Double Effect, ethics, intention vs foresight, Shelly Kagan, kill and let‐die cases, killing and letting die, killing vs letting‐die, moral differences, moral equivalence, moral significance, negative vs positive rights, objections, positive and negative agency, Warren Quinnself‐ownership

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