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The Book of Evidence$
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Peter Achinstein

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780195143898

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195143892.001.0001

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Objective Epistemic Probability

Objective Epistemic Probability

Chapter:
(p.95) 5 Objective Epistemic Probability
Source:
The Book of Evidence
Author(s):

Peter Achinstein (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195143892.003.0005

A new concept of probability ‐ objective epistemic probability ‐ is introduced and defended. It is epistemic because it is a measure of the degree of reasonableness of believing something; it is objective because it is independent of the beliefs of any person or group. The view is contrasted with several others, including the subjective Bayesian theory of probability, which is epistemic but not objective; with the propensity theory, which is objective but not epistemic; and with Carnap's view, which, like the view defended, is both epistemic and objective but, unlike it, is relativized to a potential epistemic situation.

Keywords:   a priori probability, Bayes, Carnap, evidence, objective epistemic probability, propensity probability, reasonableness of belief, subjective Bayesian probability

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