An enriched version of naturalism is defended. Naturalism is too often construed foremost as something that eliminates phenomena (eliminativism), and reduces our number of explanatory tools (reductionism). In fact, the sciences almost always increase the number of entities that we need to explain the phenomena. Philosophy, in comparison, has had vastly more reductive views (such as that mind and action can be explained in terms of two kinds of mental states, belief and desire). A richer naturalism also requires recognition of the role of biology in the understanding of the mind. The view that humans are radically distinct from other kinds of animals is an error characterizing failure to appreciate the biological nature of mind.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.