Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Simulating MindsThe Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Alvin I. Goldman

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195138924

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195138929.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 25 June 2019



(p.223) 9 Self‐Attribution
Simulating Minds

Alvin I. Goldman (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Most cognitive scientists and many philosophers of mind resist the traditional notion that the mind has a special method of monitoring or accessing its own current mental states. We review the critiques of both philosophers (Wittgenstein, Burge, Shoemaker) and cognitive scientists (Gazzaniga, Nisbett and Wilson, Gopnik), based on confabulation or self/other parallelism, and find all to be wanting. We then examine the more congenial monitoring account of Nichols and Stich, but find it incapable of handling the problem of attitude-type identification. A nuanced special-method approach is presented that combines introspection (inner recognition) for self-attributing state-types and redeployment for self-attributing attitude contents. The question of what the input-properties are for introspection is addressed at length.

Keywords:   attitude types, confabulation, input-properties, introspection, monitoring, Nichols and Stich, redeployment, self/other parallelism, Shoemaker

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .