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Morals from Motives$
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Michael Slote

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780195138375

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195138376.001.0001

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Extending the Approach

Extending the Approach

(p.197) Eight Extending the Approach
Morals from Motives

Michael Slote (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Views that understand both morality and human well‐being in agent‐based terms can be called ”hyper‐agent‐based.” The present such approach treats each of the agent‐based elements of practical rationality and morality as grounding its own separate and distinctive human good (element in human well‐being). Thus, for example, the rational virtue of noninsatiability (moderation) is arguably necessary to and helps constitute appetitive goods; the rational value of strength of purpose is groundingly essential to the distinctive good of achievement/accomplishment; the courage not to deceive oneself about unpleasant facts helps constitute the human good of wisdom; and the moral virtues of (various forms of) caring underlie and help bring about what is good (for us) about love, friendship, political involvement (or civic friendship), and the like. It is argued that all human goods can be plausibly fitted into this hyper‐agent‐based view of what is good for us and that such a unified explanatory scheme is superior to a mere ”objective list,” however intuitive, of human goods.

Keywords:   achievement, appetitive goods, caring, courage, friendship, human good, hyper‐agent‐based well‐being, love, moderation, morality, noninsatiability, objective list, practical rationality, rationality, strength of purpose, virtues, wisdom

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