Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Morals from Motives$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Michael Slote

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780195138375

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195138376.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 20 November 2019

The Virtue in Self‐Interest

The Virtue in Self‐Interest

Chapter:
(p.141) Six The Virtue in Self‐Interest
Source:
Morals from Motives
Author(s):

Michael Slote (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195138376.003.0006

An agent‐based approach can also help us understand what is good for people, human well‐being. Utilitarianism reduces virtue and morality to certain relationships with human or sentient well‐being; but Stoicism and even Aristotle can be understood as having reversed this order of explanation. For the latter, virtue is the basis for understanding human well‐being. An agent‐based ethics of caring can draw on certain ideas of Plato in order to argue that the moral virtue of caring and certain nonmoral virtues such as strength of purpose help make certain experiences and ways of living count as good for us. This reversed reductionism can be called “elevationism”, and it represents a significant alternative to both dualistic (Kantian) and reductionistic accounts of the relation between moral virtue and human well‐being or welfare.

Keywords:   agent‐based, Aristotle, dualism, elevationism, Kantian, Plato, reductionism, Stoicism, utilitarianism, virtue, well‐being

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .