Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Morals from Motives$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Michael Slote

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780195138375

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195138376.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 16 July 2019

Agent‐Based Virtue Ethics

Agent‐Based Virtue Ethics

Chapter:
(p.3) One Agent‐Based Virtue Ethics
Source:
Morals from Motives
Author(s):

Michael Slote (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195138376.003.0001

Aristotelian virtue ethics does not treat motives or even character (traits) as the grounding basis for the rest of ethics, but the present agent‐based approach does. However, there are objections to agent‐basing that need to be considered. Having answered those objections, the chapter discusses three major forms of agent‐based virtue ethics: a somewhat less than plausible ”morality as inner strength” (inspired by Plato, the Stoics, and Nietzsche); ”morality as universal benevolence” (inspired by Hutcheson); and ”morality as caring” (inspired by Gilligan and Noddings). Any agent‐based morality does well to treat overall motivation, rather than occasional single motives, as the fundamental basis for ethical characterizations.

Keywords:   agent‐based, Aristotelian, Gilligan, motives, Nietzsche, Noddings, overall motivation, Plato, single motives, Stoics, virtue ethics

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .