Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Global Public GoodsInternational Cooperation in the 21st Century$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc Stern

Print publication date: 1999

Print ISBN-13: 9780195130522

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195130529.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 26 June 2019

Preventing Deadly Conflict

Preventing Deadly Conflict

From Global Housekeeping to Neighbourhood Watch

Chapter:
(p.366) Preventing Deadly Conflict
Source:
Global Public Goods
Author(s):

David A. Hamburg

Jane E. Holl

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195130529.003.0019

Through an interesting dynamic, there is at present an interesting intersection of two literatures – that on conventional foreign aid and that on global externalities and public goods. Some of the key questions that emerge from this are (1) Could international public goods and cross‐border spillovers provide a revived rationale for old‐fashioned transfers intended to spur development in poor countries? (2) When faced with the choice of making transfers or contributing to an international public good, what should a donor country do – even if its objectives are governed by self‐interest rather than solidarity? (3) What happens to the many issues (like conditionality and ownership) in old‐fashioned solidarity‐driven aid, so exhaustively and exhaustingly debated over the past 20 years or more, in this new world of international public goods?

The objective of this chapter is to begin the discussion of these questions, which seem to have been neglected in the rush to embrace international public goods as a new rationale for maintaining international development cooperation and even traditional aid flows. We set out a simple model of interaction between two countries that share a common public good and pose the problem of the richer “donor” country deciding between making a transfer or contributing to a public good, while being concerned only about the impact of outcomes on its own well‐being. We next analyze the problem with different specifications of the public good. We conclude by discussing the implications of this analysis and the areas for further research.

Keywords:   cross‐border spillovers, economic transfers, foreign aid, global externalities, global public goods, international development cooperation, public goods, solidarity

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .