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The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology$
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Paul K. Moser

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780195130058

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195130057.001.0001

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A Priori Knowledge

A Priori Knowledge

Chapter:
(p.95) Chapter 3 A Priori Knowledge
Source:
The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology
Author(s):

Albert Casullo

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195130057.003.0004

In “A Priori Knowledge,” Albert Casullo asks whether there is a priori knowledge. He ultimately defines a priori knowledge as true belief with a priori justification, where a belief is a priori justified if it is nonexperientially justified. Armed with this definition, Casullo evaluates several traditional arguments for and against the existence of a priori knowledge. He concludes that the traditional arguments reach an impasse by arguing on a priori grounds that the opposite position is deficient. A successful way to defend a priori knowledge, he argues, would be to find empirical evidence that supports the existence of nonexperiential sources of justification.

Keywords:   a priori, a priori justification, a priori knowledge, a priori warrant, Albert Casullo, justification, knowledge

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