Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Paul K. Moser

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780195130058

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195130057.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 15 November 2019

Decision Theory and Epistemology

Decision Theory and Epistemology

Chapter:
(p.434) Chapter 15 Decision Theory and Epistemology
Source:
The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology
Author(s):

Mark Kaplan (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195130057.003.0016

In ”Decision Theory and Epistemology,” Mark Kaplan finds it characteristic of orthodox Bayesians to hold that (I) for each person and each hypothesis she comprehends, there is a precise degree of confidence that person has in the truth of that proposition, and (II) no person can be counted as rational unless the degree of confidence assignment she thus harbors satisfies the axioms of the probability calculus. Kaplan's purpose is twofold. First, he aims to show that, as powerful as many criticisms are against orthodox Bayesianism, there is a credible kind of Bayesianism. Without appeal to idealization or false precision, it offers a substantive account of how the probability calculus constrains the (imprecise) opinions of actual persons and of how this account impinges on traditional epistemological concerns. Second, he aims to show how this Bayesianism finds a foundation in considerations concerning rational preference.

Keywords:   Bayesianism, confidence assignment, categorical belief, decision theory, Mark Kaplan, probability, probability calculus, rational, rational preference

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .