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The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology$
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Paul K. Moser

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780195130058

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195130057.001.0001

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Mind and Knowledge

Mind and Knowledge

(p.316) Chapter 10 Mind and Knowledge
The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology

John Heil

Oxford University Press

In “Mind and Knowledge,” John Heil notes that our knowledge of the world depends on our nature as knowers. He argues that the fact that it is unclear how we could convincingly establish, in a noncircular manner, that the world is as we think it is, suggests skepticism, and that realism and skepticism go hand in hand. Heil discusses the implications of such a view, particularly as they concern knowledge we seemingly have of our own states of mind. He considers the view that to calibrate ourselves as knowers we should proceed from resources “immediately available to the mind” to conclusions about the external world. He evaluates Descartes's attempt to do this, and examines two other possibilities: an externalist view of mental content and an internalist approach to content.

Keywords:   Descartes, external world, externalism, John Heil, internalism, knower, mental content, mind, realism, skepticism

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