Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Knowledge, Truth, and DutyEssays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Matthias Steup

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780195128925

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195128923.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 04 April 2020

Value Monism in Epistemology

Value Monism in Epistemology

(p.170) 10 Value Monism in Epistemology
Knowledge, Truth, and Duty

Michael R. DePaul (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Value monism is the view that truth is the only intrinsic epistemic good, and justification is valuable only as a means to true belief. Argues against this view. The two propositions – (1) truth is the only intrinsic epistemic good, and (2) knowledge is better than mere true belief – cannot, according to the writer, both be true. Since (2) is obviously true, we must reject (1), and embrace value pluralism, which asserts that in addition to truth, there are further intrinsic goods, such as knowledge and justification.

Keywords:   intrinsically good, justification, knowledge, monism, pluralism, truth

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .