Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Robert Merrihew Adams

Print publication date: 1999

Print ISBN-13: 9780195126495

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195126491.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 October 2019

Primitive and Derivative Forces

Primitive and Derivative Forces

(p.378) 13 Primitive and Derivative Forces
Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist

Robert Merrihew Adams

Oxford University Press

The relation between primitive and derivative forces may be the hardest problem about the relation between Leibniz's physics and his metaphysics. He holds that derivative forces are modifications of primitive forces, but also that physical forces, which he classifies as derivative forces, belong to bodies, which are aggregates, whereas primitive forces belong to unextended perceiving substances (monads) and constitute their essence. This chapter addresses this problem, arguing that a major part of it can be solved on the supposition that physical events are only phenomena, and hence ultimately determined by modifications of the primitive forces of perceiving substances (monads).

Keywords:   aggregates, derivative forces, Leibniz, metaphysics, modifications, monads, perceiving substances, phenomena, physical forces, physics, primitive forces

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .